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Abstract
We model a two-candidate electoral competition in which there is un-
certainty about a policy-relevant state of the world. The candidates re-
ceive private signals about the true state, which are imperfectly correlated.
We study whether the candidates are able to credibly communicate their
information to voters through their choice of policy platforms. Our results
show that the fact that private information is dispersed between the can-
didates creates a strong incentive for them to bias their messages toward
the electorate’s prior. Information transmission becomes more di¢cult,
the less correlated are the candidates’ signals, the lower is the signals’
quality, and the stronger is the electorate’s prior. Indeed, for weak pri-
ors welfare decreases as the prior becomes stronger, and welfare always
decreases as the signals become less correlated.
JEL classi…cation: D72, D78, D82
Keywords: Electoral competition; Information transmission; Cheap talk;
Opportunism; Public opinion; Correlation
1 Introduction
An important and much debated question in political economy is whether democ-
racies produce e¢cient results. The school of thought often associated with the
University of Chicago contends that, because of competition for votes between
political parties or candidates, public policy will indeed be e¢cient (see e.g.
Wittman 1989). The “Virginia School” of political economy, in contrast, argues
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that voters typically do not have full information about the e¤ects of di¤erent
policies and, therefore, politicians are able to select policies that are ine¢cient.
Moreover, although the voters would gain if they knew more about the e¤ects
of the di¤erent policies and thereby were better able to control the politicians,
the voters will remain rationally ignorant ; that is, since the probability that
an individual voter will a¤ect the outcome of an election is very small, she will
not acquire costly information about the political alternatives. While Wittman
(1989) agrees that voters may initially not be well informed about political mar-
kets, he argues that competition between political candidates also eliminates this
problem: “The arguments made for the voter’s being uninformed implicitly as-
sume that the major cost of information falls on the voter. However, there are
returns to an informed political entrepreneur from providing the information to
the voters, winning o¢ce, and gaining the direct and indirect rewards of holding
o¢ce” (p. 1400).
Wittman’s argument raises the question how a political entrepreneur who
tries to transmit information to the electorate can do this without facing a
severe credibility problem. How does the entrepreneur convince the voters that
he, when making statements and choosing his electoral platform, indeed pursues
the electorate’s — rather than his own — goals? Presumably the goals of the
entrepreneur include winning o¢ce, and succeeding in this should be at least
as important for him as implementing some particular policy. In this paper
we argue that information transmission from political candidates to voters is
indeed very di¢cult. In particular we argue that candidates — because of the
very reason that they are in a competition — will have a strong incentive to
follow popular beliefs (i.e., the voters’ prior) instead of their own information.
Why, then, do popular beliefs have such a strong drawing power? Our ar-
gument goes as follows. When the political entrepreneur considers what policy
suggestion to make to the voters, he should anticipate that his opponents may
also have access to private information about which policy is the best one for the
voters — and that the voters, too, are aware of this. Hence, the entrepreneur
knows that, in order to win the election, he must convince the electorate that
his policy suggestion — and not the ones of the other candidates — is the one
that is most likely to lead to the preferred outcome. This means, in particular,
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that the entrepreneur should not be truthful to the electorate when his private
information goes against the voters’ prior beliefs. For if a competing candidate
were to suggest a policy that is more in line with the electorate’s prior beliefs,
the entrepreneur will have a hard time convincing the voters that his informa-
tion should have a heavier weight than their prior and the other candidate’s
information taken together. The dilemma for the voters, however, is that in-
formation that di¤ers from the prior is precisely the kind of information that
would be useful for them.
Hence, the source of the di¢culty in transmitting information to the voters
is that information is dispersed among the political candidates: they do not
have access to exactly the same pieces of information. The reason for this, we
believe, is that candidates do not typically get their information from exactly the
same sources. For instance, we should expect the candidates to get at least part
of their information through personal experiences. Moreover, when consulting
experts, di¤erent candidates often consult di¤erent experts.1
In the model that we develop in this paper there are two political candidates
who run for o¢ce. Both of them have some private information about which
policy is the best one for the electorate. We allow for any degree of correlation
between the noisy signals that the candidates observe: from independence (con-
ditionally on the true state) to almost perfect correlation. The policy space (as
well as the signal space) is for simplicity assumed to be binary: the alternatives
between which society must choose are “building a bridge” (B) and “not build-
ing a bridge” (N). A key assumption is that the electorate’s prior beliefs are
such that one of the policies (B) is more likely than the other to be the best one.
Prior to the election the candidates, who are o¢ce-motivated, simultaneously
announce policy platforms. After having observed the announced platforms but
not the candidates’ private signals, the members of the electorate vote for one
of the candidates. Finally the winning candidate takes o¢ce and implements
his announced platform.
From a welfare point of view, the most desirable behavior on the part of
1 This presumption of ours that politicians as a group are better informed than each politi-
cian individually has a parallel in the literature on the so-called Condorcet jury theorem (see
Piketty 1999 and the references therein). This literature assumes that policy-relevant infor-
mation is dispersed among voters rather than candidates, and it investigates whether the
information can be aggregated in a voting procedure.
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the candidates would be if they revealed all their private information by always
choosing platform B if having observed a signal in favor of B, and platform N
if having observed a signal in favor of N . We show, however, that this behavior
cannot be part of a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium.2 Indeed, within the family of
equilibria in which the candidates do not randomize in their platform choices,
the only equilibria that survive a reasonable equilibrium selection criterion3
are babbling (i.e., no information at all can be inferred from the candidates’
behavior): either the candidates always choose platform B (the popular-beliefs
equilibria) or they always choose platform N . The latter equilibria are Pareto-
dominated by the former, however, and we therefore conclude that, within this
family of equilibria, the outcome associated with the popular-beliefs equilibria
is the more reasonable prediction.
The result that popular beliefs have a strong drawing power also holds quali-
tatively when we consider equilibria in which the candidates are not constrained
to play pure strategies. Again disregarding equilibrium outcomes that are Pareto
dominated by other equilibrium outcomes, we get the following unique predic-
tion of our model: when the prior beliefs that B is the best policy are relatively
strong, then the candidates follow popular beliefs (with probability one); and
when the prior is relatively weak, then a mixed equilibrium is played in which
the candidates’ behavior is distorted toward popular beliefs. For the subset
of the parameter space where the mixed equilibrium is played, we obtain the
following comparative statics result. Information transmission becomes more
di¢cult, (i) the less correlated are the candidates’ signals, (ii) the lower is the
signals’ quality, and (iii) the larger is the prior probability that B is the best
policy. Moreover, welfare always decreases as the signals become less correlated,
even though this increases the amount of information the candidates receive col-
lectively. Finally, for weak priors welfare decreases as more prior information
becomes available. The reason for the last result is that more prior informa-
tion distorts the candidates’ incentives to reveal the information in their signals
2 Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that there always exist another kind of fully
revealing equilibria. In these equilibria, however, having access to the candidates’ information
is not useful for the electorate. The reason for this is the way by which one of the candidates
reveals his information: he consistently chooses the policy that his signal indicates he should
not choose; as a consequence, this candidate always loses the election.




The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section
we describe a relatively simple model that captures our argument. Section 3
considers some useful benchmarks. In Section 4 our main model is analyzed and
the results are presented. In Section 5 we review the related literature. Section
6 concludes and discusses the robustness of our results. Most of the proofs are
relegated to three appendices.
2 The Model
Consider the following model of an election with two candidates and one rep-
resentative voter. There are two policy alternatives, B and N, and two states
of the world, !B and !N . For the sake of concreteness we can think of policy
B as “building a bridge” and policy N as “not building a bridge”; the states of
the world can be thought of as “the costs of building a bridge will be modest”
(!B) and as “building a bridge will be very costly” (!N). The voter wants the
bridge to be built if and only if the costs will be modest. More precisely, given
a policy x 2 fB;Ng and a state ! 2 f!B; !Ng, the voter’s payo¤ function
u (x; !) is such that u (B;!B) = u (N;!N) = 1 and u (B;!N) = u (N;!B) = 0.
It is also assumed that the prior distribution of the state is in favor of policy B,





. That is, if the prior is the only information that is
available, the best policy from the voter’s point of view is to build the bridge.
The two political candidates are labeled 1 and 2. We adopt the standard
Downsian assumption that they are only o¢ce-motivated: candidate i’s (where
i 2 f1; 2g) payo¤ if he wins the election is 1, and 0 otherwise. We also assume,
again in keeping with the Downsian framework, that the candidates precommit
to electoral platforms. More exactly, the sequence of events is as follows. First
each one of the two candidates privately observes a noisy signal si 2 fB;Ng
about the true state !. Second, conditional upon his signal si, each candidate
chooses an electoral platform xi 2 fB;Ng; the candidates do this simultane-
ously. Finally the voter observes the candidates’ chosen platforms x1 and x2
and then chooses for whom to vote. The candidate who gets the vote wins o¢ce
4 This particular reason why access to more information can be detrimental to an economic
agent has not, to our knowledge, been recognized previously in the literature. For other
reasons why more information can be bad, see Lagerlöf (2001) and references therein.
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and implements his previously chosen policy.
The signal technology is described by the following table:5
Pr (s2 = k j ! = !k) Pr (s2 = j j ! = !k)
P
Pr (s1 = k j ! = !k) (1 ¡ ")2 + ½" (1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ½) " (1 ¡ ") 1 ¡ "
Pr (s1 = j j ! = !k) (1 ¡ ½) " (1 ¡ ") "2 + ½" (1 ¡ ") "P
1 ¡ " " 1
where j; k 2 fB;Ng for j 6= k. The parameter ½ 2 [0; 1) is a measure of the
degree of correlation between the candidates’ signals: for ½ close to unity they
are almost perfectly correlated whereas for ½ = 0 they are, conditionally on
the true state, independent. The parameter " 2 ¡0; 12¢ is inversely related to
the quality of the signals: (1 ¡ ") is the probability that a candidate’s signal is
“correct.” Notice that in this formulation of the signal technology it is implicitly
assumed that the quality of the candidates’ signals are the same.
Let ¾ji denote the probability that candidate i 2 f1; 2g chooses platform
B after having observed a signal j 2 fB;Ng. Moreover, let ¾jk3 denote the
probability with which the voter elects candidate 1 when having observed the



















denote a vector of (behavioral) strategies of the three players.
The equilibrium concept that we employ is that of perfect Bayesian equi-
librium, where this equilibrium concept is de…ned in the usual way: all three
players must make optimal choices at all information sets given their beliefs, and
the beliefs are formed using Bayes’ rule when that is de…ned. For the sake of
brevity we will refer to a strategy pro…le ¾ as an equilibrium if there exist beliefs
of the players such that ¾ together with these beliefs form a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
3 Some Observations and Benchmarks
As mentioned in the previous section, we assume that when the voter only knows
the prior, her belief is that policy B is the best one (q > 1=2). Before solving
5 We have borrowed this way of modeling the correlation between the signals from Bhaskar
and van Damme (2000).
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for the equilibria of the model, it will be useful to investigate how the voter
would change her beliefs about which policy is the best one if she were able
to infer the signal of one of the candidates and if she were able to infer both
candidates’ signals. First, suppose the voter knew the content of exactly one of
the signals. Then, if this signal indicated that B is the best policy, the voter
would of course still prefer policy B, since her prior also favors this policy. If the
signal indicated that N is the best policy, then the voter would change her mind
and prefer policy N only if the probability of a correct signal is larger than the
prior probability that B is the best policy: 1 ¡ " > q;6 if this inequality were
reversed, the voter would still prefer policy B.
Second, suppose the voter knew the content of both signals. Then, if both
indicated policy B, the voter would of course still prefer policy B. Similarly,
if one signal were in favor of B and the other in favor of N, the voter would
again still prefer policy B, since the signals are of the same quality and thus
their informational contents would cancel out. If both signals indicated policy
N, then the voter would prefer policy N only if the prior probability that B is
the best policy is not too large:7
q <
(1 ¡ ") [1 ¡ " (1 ¡ ½)]
1 ¡ 2" (1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ½) ´ eq: (1)
If this inequality were reversed, the voter would still prefer policy B even after
having observed two signals indicating N. Since this would not make for an
interesting problem, we assume that q 2 (1=2; eq) throughout the analysis.
Let us now look at a welfare benchmark in which a planner who maximizes
the voter’s expected utility can dictate to each one of the two candidates which
platform to choose as a function of that candidate’s signal. The voter then, just
as in our main model, updates her beliefs given the observed platforms and elects
the candidate who will give her the highest expected utility given her updated
beliefs. The best thing the planner can do is to let each candidate choose
platform B if having observed a signal B, and platform N if having observed
a signal N. This means that the voter will, if the candidates’ platforms di¤er,
elect the candidate who has chosen platform B ; if the platforms are identical,
then it does not matter who she elects.
6 One can check this formally by using Bayes’ rule.
7 Again, this expression can be derived by using Bayes’ rule.
7
Let us denote the voter’s expected utility in this benchmark by EUBM . We
get
EUBM = Pr (! = !B) Pr (s1 = B _ s2 = B j ! = !B)
+ Pr (! = !N)Pr (s1 = N ^ s2 = N j ! = !N)
= q
h
(1 ¡ ")2 + 2" (1 ¡ ") ¡ " (1 ¡ ") ½
i
+ (1 ¡ q)
h
(1 ¡ ")2 + " (1 ¡ ") ½
i
= (1 ¡ ") [1 + " (2q ¡ 1) (1 ¡ ½)] :
The expected utility EUBM forms a useful benchmark since it gives us an upper
bound on the level of expected utility that may be realized in any equilibrium.
Notice that EUBM is decreasing in ½, as we would expect: welfare is higher if
the signals are less correlated because then there is more information available.
Finally in this section we will investigate two positive benchmarks in which
the assumptions of our main model are slightly altered. Doing this will help
us understand exactly what features of the model drive the results that we will
derive later. The …rst benchmark is the case where ½ = 1. That is, here the
candidates observe the same signal, and the content of this signal is unobservable
to the voter. The second benchmark is a situation where there are no popular
beliefs, that is, where q = 1=2. We make the following observation.
Observation 1 (Identical Signals or No Popular Beliefs). Suppose that
either (a) ½ = 1 or (b) q = 1=2. Then ¾ = (1; 0; 1; 0;¾3; ¾3; ¾3; ¾3) for any
¾3 2 [0; 1] is an equilibrium.
Part (a) of Observation 1 says that if the candidates have access to exactly
the same information, then there exists an equilibrium with full revelation, that
is, an equilibrium in which the candidates’ behavior is such that the voter can
perfectly infer the contents of their signals. To see that this claim is true, notice
that none of the candidates will have an incentive to deviate since they win the
election with the same probability for all platform con…gurations. Similarly, the
voter will surely not have an incentive to deviate if the platforms are the same.
Moreover, the voter will observe di¤erent platforms only o¤ the equilibrium
path, and one can easily check that there exist out-of-equilibrium beliefs that
make her behavior optimal also at those information sets.8 Part (b) of Obser-
vation 1 says that if there are no popular beliefs, then again there exists a fully
8 For ¾3 2 (0; 1), the requirement on these beliefs o¤ the equilibrium path is that the voter
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revealing equilibrium in which both candidates follow their signals. Here, key
to why full revelation is possible is that if the candidates have chosen di¤erent
platforms — which means that the voter can infer that one of them received a
signal in favor of B while the other received a signal in favor of N — then the
voter’s updated beliefs will be identical to her prior beliefs; this is because the
quality of the signals is the same and hence the informational contents of the
two signals cancel out.
4 Equilibrium Behavior
We will now return to the main model described in Section 2. First we solve
for equilibria of that model in which both candidates (at both their information
sets) choose pure strategies9 (Section 4.1). After that we investigate equilibria
in which at least one of the candidates (at at least one of his information sets)
is randomizing between the platforms (Section 4.2).
4.1 Candidates’ Playing Pure
Let us start with considering the possible existence of an equilibrium with full
revelation. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, it turns that such equilibria do exist.
Proposition 1 (Full Revelation). A strategy pro…le ¾ is a fully revealing
equilibrium if and only if ¾ 2 f(1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1) ; (0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0)g :
In words, there exist exactly two equilibria that are fully revealing; these
di¤er from each other only with respect to the labeling of the candidates. In
each one of the equilibria, one of the candidates is winning the election with
probability one regardless of which platforms he and the other candidate have
chosen. The winning candidate is choosing policy B if observing a signal B, and
policy N if observing a signal N. The candidate who is always losing chooses
policy N if observing a signal B, and policy B if observing a signal N. That is,
equilibria in which the voter can infer both candidates’ information do exist,
but having this information is not very useful for the voter; she always votes for
thinks that a candidate who has chosen a platform B is, to some extent, more likely to have
deviated than the candidate who has chosen platform N.
9 When we say that the candidates “choose pure strategies” (or “play pure”) in an equilib-






2 2 f0; 1g.
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one of the candidates anyway, mainly because the losing candidate’s behavior is
rather odd: he always does the opposite to what his signal suggests he “should”
do.
Denote the voter’s expected utility in a fully revealing equilibrium by EUFR.
We know that in this kind of equilibrium one of the candidates always wins the
election, and this candidate chooses platform B if and only if he has observed a
signal B. Hence, EUFR = 1¡". Figure 1 illustrates how EUFR and the expected
utility in the welfare benchmark, EUBM , vary with the prior q. Unsurprisingly,
we see that EUFR is always strictly lower than EUBM .
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Why is it impossible to sustain an equilibrium in which both candidates
announce platforms identical to their signals? The basic reason is that the policy
that the voter prefers when only knowing the prior (i.e., policy B) has a too
strong drawing power. To see this, suppose that we indeed had an equilibrium
in which both candidates followed their signals. Now, if it turns out that the
candidates have chosen di¤erent platforms, then the voter can infer that one of
them has received a signal in favor of B while the other one has received a signal
in favor of N. Since the quality of the signals are the same, the informational
contents of the two signals will cancel out and B is still the alternative that is
most likely to be the best one. Hence, the voter will elect the candidate choosing
platform B. Anticipating this, a candidate who has received a signal N will have
an incentive, we claim, not to choose platform N but platform B.
To see why this claim is true, suppose for simplicity that when both can-
didates have chosen the same platform, the voter elects either one with equal
probability.10 Then, if a candidate who has received a signal in favor of pol-
icy N follows his equilibrium strategy and chooses platform N, he will lose for
sure if his opponent has received a signal B and win with probability 1/2 if
his opponent also has received a signal N. On the other hand, if he deviates
and chooses policy B, he will win with probability 1/2 if the opponent also has
10 Of course, since the voter is indi¤erent between the candidates when they have chosen
the same platform, it would also be optimal for the voter to randomize with some other
probability. A proof of Proposition 1 must, therefore, generalize the argument in the text to
any probability. We do this in Appendix A.
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received a signal B and win for sure if the opponent has received a signal N.
Thus, a candidate who has received a signal N will prefer to choose platform B.
The equilibria that are characterized in Proposition 1 are actually quite
fragile. Indeed, the reason why we can sustain a fully revealing equilibrium
in which one candidate always “does the opposite” is that this candidate is
always — even when the candidates have chosen the same platform — losing
the election for sure. If there were the slightest amount of uncertainty about
which candidate the voter elects when the platforms are the same, then platform
B would again have a too strong drawing power and the fully revealing equilibria
would cease to exist. Quite apart from that argument, one can also wonder what
a candidate who knows that he will lose with probability one is doing in the race
in the …rst place. We now introduce an assumption that indeed implies that,
if choosing the same platform as his opponent, a candidate will not be able to
predict the outcome of the election perfectly.
Assumption 1 (Symmetric Voting). The probability with which the voter
elects a candidate is independent of the labeling of the candidates: ¾BB3 =
¾NN3 = 1=2 and ¾
BN
3 = 1 ¡ ¾NB3 .
We …nd this assumption reasonable since the candidates are ex ante identical.
It is also in line with what is assumed in standard formulations of the Hotelling-
Downs model, namely that if the two candidates choose the same platform then
they share the votes equally; see e.g. Osborne (1995).11
As is evident from Proposition 1, Assumption 1 rules out the possibility of
an equilibrium with full revelation. As the following proposition shows (we will
ignore the knife-edge case where q = 1 ¡ "), the only pure-strategy equilibria
that survive Assumption 1 are babbling ones, that is, equilibria in which the
voter cannot infer any information about the contents of the signals.
Proposition 2 (Surviving Pure Equilibria). Suppose that q 6= 1 ¡ ". A
strategy pro…le ¾ that satis…es Assumption 1 and in which the candidates
play pure is an equilibrium if and only if either
11 In a working paper version of the present paper (Heidhues and Lagerlöf, 2000) we use an
alternative Assumption 1, which gives us the same results as here. This alternative assumption
requires that, if the chosen platform con…guration is such that the voter is indi¤erent between
the candidates, both of them win with positive probability. We justify the assumption by
arguing that this is in fact the way in which the candidates would perceive the voter’s behavior




1; 1; 1; 1; 12 ; ®; 1 ¡ ®; 12
¢
for ® 2 £12 ; 1¤ and q 2 ¡12 ; 1 ¡ "¢; or
¾ =
¡




for q 2 (1 ¡ "; eq); or
(b) ¾ =
¡
0; 0; 0; 0; 12 ; 1 ¡ ®;®; 12
¢
for ® 2 £12 ; 1¤ and q 2 ¡12 ; 1 ¡ "¢.
In the babbling equilibria described in part (a) of Proposition 2 (which we
will call the popular-beliefs equilibria), policy B is always implemented. Both
candidates win with positive probability and, when choosing their platforms,
they both follow the voter’s prior. In the babbling equilibria described in part
(b), policy N is always implemented. This equilibrium outcome is indeed rather
odd. It can be sustained only because the voter’s out-of-equilibrium beliefs are
such that if a candidate is the only one choosing platform B, then the voter
believes that this candidate observed a signal in favor of N with a su¢ciently
high probability.12
Let us denote the voter’s expected utility in the equilibria described in part
(a) of Proposition 2 by EUBbab, and in (b) by EU
N
bab. Because in (a) the winning
candidate always chooses platform B, the voter’s expected utility is here simply
given by the prior: EUBbab = q. Similarly, EU
N
bab = 1 ¡ q. The graphs of these
functions are depicted in Figure 1. Both the babbling equilibrium outcomes are
in welfare terms worse than the outcome of the welfare benchmark. This is,
of course, particularly true for the equilibrium in which the candidates babble
on N . Furthermore, it follows from Figure 1 that, for q > 1 ¡ ", the fully
revealing equilibrium is worse in welfare terms than the equilibrium in which
both candidates babble on B.
From Proposition 2 it follows that for low enough values of the prior, impos-
ing Assumption 1 does not yield a unique equilibrium outcome. One natural
criterion for selecting among the remaining equilibria, which is often used in ap-
plications of cheap talk games, is to assume that an equilibrium is not played if
its associated outcome is Pareto dominated by some other equilibrium outcome.
If we use this criterion, then, for all q (such that q 6= 1 ¡ "), the outcome of the
popular-beliefs equilibria is the only one that survives.13 This suggests that,
12 Indeed, equilibria that are “truly” babbling — in the sense that both the voter’s equilib-
rium and out-of-equilibrium beliefs are identical to her prior beliefs — can be found only in
part (a) of Proposition 2.
13 This result follows immediately from the fact that the candidates (by Assumption 1)
are equally well o¤ under the popular-beliefs equilibrium outcome as under the equilibrium
outcome in which the candidates babble on N, and the voter strictly prefers the popular-beliefs
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provided the candidates are required to play pure, the most reasonable predic-
tion of the game is the outcome associated with the popular-beliefs equilibria.
Hence, the lesson that the analysis in this subsection seems to teach us is
that, given that the candidates must play pure and that their signals are not
perfectly correlated, no information transmission at all is possible in equilibrium.
Indeed, this is the conclusion of the authors. A more conservative interpretation
of the results, however, would not dismiss the equilibria of Proposition 1, in
which the information of one of the candidates is credibly transmitted and made
use of. In fact, as the reader easily can verify, for q < 1 ¡ " there also exist
partially revealing pure-strategy equilibria in which one candidate, who always
wins, follows his signal and the other one babbles on either B or N, although
these equilibria do not survive Assumption 1. The conservative conclusion would
then be that, as long as the candidates’ signals are not perfectly correlated, one
signal at the most can be credibly transmitted and made use of in equilibrium.14
As we will see in the following subsection, this conclusion is also valid if we allow
the candidates to randomize in their platform choices.
4.2 Candidates’ Mixing
Let us thus consider the existence and the welfare properties of equilibria in
which at least one of the candidates is mixing at at least one of his information
sets. By doing so, we will be able to check the robustness of our “follow-popular-
beliefs” result from the previous subsection.15 Throughout the rest of the paper
outcome.
14 One may notice that this result is consistent with our argument in the Introduction that
information transmission will be di¢cult because of the very reason that the candidates are
competing with each other. For the only reason why information transmission is possible in
these kinds of equilibria is that one candidate always wins so that, in practice, competition
does not play a role.
15 Indeed, in our model there is a special reason why restricting attention to equilibria
in which the candidates play pure may be overly restrictive: if we allow the candidates to
randomize, it is conceivable that they will be able to transmit more information than otherwise,
since then (and only then) will they be able to choose the amount of noise in their messages
continuously and endogenously. Yet, focusing attention on equilibria in which the candidates
randomize between platforms raises the question how to interpret such behavior.
The interpretation that we have in mind relies on Harsanyi’s (1973) puri…cation idea. That
is, we view the electoral competition as a frequently occurring event in which the candidates’
payo¤s are subject to small random variations. In particular the candidates could, on top
of being o¢ce-motivated, have some small ideological leanings toward one of the policies,
and the magnitude of this incremental payo¤ term is private information to the candidate.
What is perceived as randomizations would, then, in fact be deterministic choices given some
realization of the stochastic term. Moreover, a candidate does not need to make a deliberate
choice to use his pure strategies with the required probabilities; instead the variations in the
payo¤s induce him to, over time, choose each pure strategy with the right frequency. What
13
we maintain Assumption 1.
Recall that the reason why a fully revealing equilibrium in which the can-
didates follow their signals cannot exist is that whenever the candidates have
chosen di¤erent platforms, the voter will elect the candidate with platform B
with probability one; as a consequence, no candidate will ever follow a signal in
favor of N. In order to …nd a mixed equilibrium in which the candidates follow
their signals at least to some degree, it is thus natural to start looking for cir-
cumstances under which the voter will be indi¤erent between the candidates if
having observed two di¤erent platforms. Hence, suppose the candidates’ behav-
ior is such that (a) (x1; x2) = (B;N) and (x1; x2) = (N;B) are played along the
equilibrium path,16 and (b) the voter’s updated beliefs after having observed
one platform B and one platform N put equal weights on the state being !B
and the state being !N :
Pr (! = !B j x1 = B;x2 = N) = Pr (! = !B j x1 = N;x2 = B) = 1
2
.
By making use of Bayes’ rule, which will be well-de…ned due to (a), we can














(q ¡ ") = ¡¾N1 ¡ ¾N2 ¢ (1 ¡ " ¡ q) : (3)
Eqs. (2) and (3) actually de…ne a whole family of mixed equilibria. Among
these, however, we want to …nd the one that performs best in terms of infor-
mation transmission and welfare. Since one would expect that it is desirable to
receive information from both candidates, let us guess that such an equilibrium
is symmetric: ¾B1 = ¾
B
2 = ¾
B and ¾N1 = ¾
N
2 = ¾
N . Moreover, given that the
prior is in favor of B, making ¾B close to unity should be more important than
making ¾N close to zero (doing both those things would not be consistent with
Harsanyi can show — thereby providing a strong justi…cation for this interpretation — is that
(somewhat loosely put), in almost any strategic form game, almost any mixed equilibrium is
close to a strict pure strategy equilibrium of any perturbation of the game in which the players’
payo¤s are subject to small random shocks. For a useful discussion of this interpretation of a
mixed equilibrium as well as others, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, pp. 37-44).
16 That is, for both candidates, we do not have ¾Bi = ¾
N






(2) and (3)); hence, let us set ¾B = 1. Eqs. (2) and (3) now simplify to one
equation having only one unknown variable, ¾N . Solving for ¾N yields
¾N =
" (1 ¡ ") (2q ¡ 1) (1 ¡ ½)
1 ¡ " ¡ q + " (1 ¡ ") (2q ¡ 1) (1 ¡ ½) ´ f (q; "; ½) : (4)
One can check that, for q < 1 ¡ ", the function f (q; "; ½) is indeed a well-
de…ned probability since it takes values strictly between zero and one. This
means that for q < 1 ¡ " there is an equilibrium in which both candidates
choose platform B with probability one when they have observed a signal in
favor of B, and they choose platform B with probability f (q; "; ½) when they
have observed a signal in favor of N. In this equilibrium, if the voter observes
the platform con…guration (x1; x2) = (B;N), for example, she can infer that
candidate 2 observed a signal in favor of N. Candidate 1, however, may or may
not have observed a signal in favor of B; this is because, with a probability
f (q; "; ½) (> 0), candidate 1 chooses platform B after having observed a signal
in favor of N.
Taking this endogenous noise into account, the voter calculates the proba-
bility that candidate 1 indeed observed a signal in favor of B. She then uses
this probability and the fact that candidate 2 observed a signal in favor of N
to update her beliefs about the true state. The magnitude of the endogenous
noise f (q; "; ½) is such that, after this updating, the two states are equally likely.
Accordingly, the voter is indi¤erent between the candidates when she sees the
platform con…guration (x1; x2) = (B;N). By symmetry, the voter is also in-
di¤erent between the candidates when she observes the platform con…guration
(x1; x2) = (N;B). This means that it is (weakly) optimal for the voter to
choose ¾BN3 = ¾
NB
3 = 1=2, which is consistent with Assumption 1. If so, the
candidates will win the election with the same probability for all four platform
con…gurations (recall Assumption 1). Hence, it is indeed (weakly) optimal for
them to randomize between the platforms when they have observed a signal in
favor of N, which in turn con…rms that f (q; "; ½) can be part of an equilibrium.
Let us denote the equilibrium that is associated with the function f by b¾;
that is,














As we conjectured above, b¾ is indeed the equilibrium that is best from the voter’s
point of view among the equilibria that are implicitly de…ned by (2) and (3) (and
we therefore, from now on, will refer to b¾ as the good mixed equilibrium). This
is one of the statements of the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Unique Prediction). For q < 1 ¡ ", the strategy pro…leb¾ is an equilibrium, and it satis…es Assumption 1. The outcome of this
equilibrium Pareto dominates the outcomes of all other equilibria that
satisfy Assumption 1. For q > 1 ¡ "; the unique equilibrium that satis…es
Assumption 1 is the popular-beliefs equilibrium.
Proposition 3 also says that if more than one signal is needed to persuade
the voter that policy N is the best policy (i.e., if q > 1 ¡ "), then the only
equilibrium surviving Assumption 1 is the popular-beliefs equilibrium. In other
words, if the voter’s prior is so strong that it is essential for her to get access
to information from more than one candidate, then any credible information
transmission is infeasible, even when we allow for mixed strategies on the part
of the candidates. For lower values of the voter’s prior (i.e., for q < 1¡"), some
information can credibly be transmitted to the voter. Even here, however, there
is a tendency for the candidates to follow popular beliefs rather than their own
information. This will be con…rmed by the comparative statics that we devote
the remainder of this section to.
Let us …rst note that f (q; "; ½) is increasing in q, with f (1=2; "; ½) = 0 and
f (1 ¡ "; "; ½) = 1. This means that, as q approaches 1=2, the endogenous noise
vanishes and we approach full revelation (cf. part (b) of Observation 1). As q
increases, however, so that the voter’s prior beliefs get more biased in favor of
policy B, the endogenous noise becomes monotonically larger; in the limit, as
q approaches 1 ¡ ", the good mixed equilibrium approaches the popular-beliefs
equilibria discussed in the previous subsection (i.e., the equilibria in which both
candidates babble on B).
The endogenous noise f (q; "; ½) is increasing also in its second argument. In
particular, as the quality of the candidates’ signals increases (i.e., as " decreases),
one moves continuously from an equilibrium that is close to the popular-beliefs
equilibria (for " close to 1 ¡ q) to an equilibrium with close to full revelation
(for " close to 0). Finally, f (q; "; ½) is decreasing in its third argument, with
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f (q; "; 0) 2 (0; 1) and f (q; "; 1) = 0. That is, information transmission becomes
easier as the signals become more correlated. In the limit, as the signals become
perfectly correlated, the endogenous noise vanishes and we again approach full
revelation (cf. part (a) of Observation 1).
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Let us further notice that a decrease in " has an unambiguously positive e¤ect
on the voter’s expected utility: a lower " means that (i) there is more information
available to the candidates, and (ii) the amount of endogenous noise becomes
smaller. For an increase in the prior q or a decrease in the degree of correlation
½, however, the corresponding two e¤ects will go in di¤erent directions: a larger
q or a smaller ½ means that (i) there is more information available, and (ii) the
amount of endogenous noise becomes larger. To see which of these two e¤ects
dominates for changes in q respectively in ½, let us calculate the voter’s expected
utility in the good mixed equilibrium, denoted by EUmix:17
EUmix = 1 ¡ " ¡ f (q; "; ½) (1 ¡ " ¡ q) : (5)
In Figure 2, the graph of EUmix is depicted as a function of q.18 This graph
tells us that for low enough values of q, the negative e¤ect of a larger amount
of endogenous noise has a heavier weight than the direct and positive e¤ect of
having access to more prior information. The level of q that yields the lowest
expected utility is given by
q± ("; ½) =
(1 ¡ ")p2 + p" (1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ½)p
2 + 2
p
" (1 ¡ ") (1 ¡ ½) :
One can show that the function q± is strictly decreasing in " with q± (0; ½) = 1
and q± (1=2; ½) = 1=2. This means that if the candidates’ signals are very
accurate, then the voter’s expected utility is, for almost all q’s, decreasing in
her prior. Intuitively, when politicians are very competent they are likely to
learn the true state through their signal; hence it does not matter much what
the value of q is, and the positive e¤ect of more prior information is therefore
insigni…cant. When the error term " gets close to 1=2, however, so that the
17 Eq. (5) is implied by Lemma A6, which is stated and proven in Appendix C.
18 A proof that EUmix is convex in q (as indicated by the …gure) is available from the authors
on request. One can also easily verify that limq!1=2 EUmix = limq!1¡" EUmix = 1¡ ".
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candidates’ signals are almost uninformative, the voter is better o¤ from an
increase in the prior q for almost all values of this parameter.
Finally notice that since f is decreasing in ½ and EUmix depends on ½ only
through f (see (5)), EUmix is always increasing in the degree of correlation
between the candidates’ signals. Hence, even though a larger ½ means that
less information is available to the candidates collectively, this e¤ect is always
dominated by the fact that the endogenous noise is smaller for larger ½.
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics results dis-
cussed above.
Proposition 4 (Comparative Statics). In the good mixed equilibrium, in-
formation transmission becomes more di¢cult: (i) the less correlated are
the candidates’ signals, (ii) the lower is the signals’ quality, and (iii) the
stronger are popular beliefs. Moreover, for q 2 ¡12 ; q± ("; ½)¢ welfare de-
creases as popular beliefs become stronger, and welfare always decreases
as the signals become less correlated.
5 Related Literature
The question whether information can be credibly transmitted from politicians
to voters has been addressed in some other papers, too.19 These papers have
also identi…ed reasons why we should, under particular circumstances, expect
such information transmission to be di¢cult. This related literature, however,
has focused on mechanisms that are di¤erent from the one investigated in the
present paper — that is, the go-for-the-prior incentive of the candidates that
arises whenever the two candidates do not have exactly the same information.
The reason why this obstacle to credible information transmission does not
appear in the previous papers is that these assume that either only one of the
candidates has private information or that both candidates have exactly the
same private information.20
19 See, for example, Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), Harrington (1992, 1993), Letterie and
Swank (1998), Martinelli (2001), Roemer (1994), Schultz (1995, 1996, 1999), and Wärneryd
(1994).
20 After having …nished the …rst version of this paper we became aware of a paper by Chan
(2001). His analysis is related to ours in that he makes the point that the degree of correlation
between two candidates’ private signals will a¤ect their platform choices. In Chan’s model,
however, the uncertainty concerns the electorate’s preferences, and it is only the candidates
who face this uncertainty. This means that, in Chan’s framework, one cannot address the
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The paper that is perhaps most closely related to ours is Schultz (1996). He
shows that whenever two political parties are su¢ciently much polarized — in
the sense that their policy preferences are su¢ciently much di¤erent from the
median voter’s — the parties will have an incentive to misrepresent their infor-
mation in order to increase their chances of winning o¢ce and thereby being
able to implement their own favorite policy. A similar e¤ect is present in Cukier-
man and Tommasi (1998). They show that, because of the credibility problem,
a typical left-wing policy may be easier to implement by a right-wing politician
(and vice versa), and it therefore “takes a Nixon to go to China.” Harrington
(1993) develops an innovative and non-standard electoral-competition model in
which an incumbent president has an incentive to bias his policy toward popu-
lar beliefs. Key to his model is that voters and candidates (exogenously) have
di¤erent beliefs as to what is the best policy.
The logic that is at work in our model is also closely related to that in
Brandenburger and Polak (1996). They show how a corporate manager who
maximizes the stock market’s assessment of the value of the …rm will follow the
market’s prior beliefs instead of his own superior information when choosing
between investment alternatives. An important and distinguishing feature of
our model compared to theirs is that our candidates care about how they are
perceived relative to their opponent. As a consequence, the degree of correla-
tion between the candidates’ signals, which does not have any counterpart in
Brandenburger and Polak, plays a central role in our analysis, and we also ob-
tain equilibria that are qualitatively di¤erent from theirs (see for example our
Proposition 1).21
The phenomenon in our model that political candidates behave opportunis-
tically and follow the electorate’s prior instead of their own information also
makes it similar to papers by Prendergast (1993) on “yes men” and by Morris
(1999) on political correctness. The yes men in Prendergast’s principal-agent
model distort their messages toward the principal’s prior because their perfor-
mance is evaluated using the principal’s opinion as a benchmark. This kind of
question how the amount of information transmission from candidates to voters is a¤ected by
the correlation.
21 For an early model that is very similar to Brandenburger and Polak’s and which con-
cerns an election, see Wärneryd (1994). There, however, there is only one politician, who
is to be approved or not by the electorate. This feature makes Wärneryd’s model closer to
Brandenburger and Polak’s than to ours, and the above remarks also apply to his model.
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incentive contract can be optimal for the principal since she wants to induce
the agent to make an e¤ort and she cannot make the contract contingent on
the true state. In Morris’s model of political correctness, a decision maker is
consulting an advisor who may be either “good” (i.e., with identical preferences
to the decision maker) or “bad” (i.e., biased in favor of a particular decision).
Since an advisor wants to be consulted also in later periods in order to in‡uence
future policy, he is anxious not to be perceived as a bad advisor. Because of
these instrumental reputational concerns, he may have an incentive to initially
bias his advice away from the bad advisor’s preferred policy.
Our model is also related, more generally, to other work on strategic infor-
mation transmission. As in Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) model of cheap talk,
sending messages in our model (i.e., choosing platforms) has no cost to the can-
didates other than that inherent in the electorate’s choice of action, since our
candidates are solely o¢ce-motivated. In their model of expert advice, Krishna
and Morgan (2001) extend the Crawford and Sobel setting by assuming that
there are two senders who act sequentially and who both know the true state.
They show that having two senders instead of only one can actually decrease
the amount of information transmitted — a result which is in the spirit of ours
although driven by other assumptions. The Krishna and Morgan paper and
several other recent models of expert advice22 di¤er from our setting in at least
two important regards. First, our “experts” (i.e., candidates) care intrinsically
about whether their “advice” is followed or not (i.e., whether they get elected).
In the cited literature, in contrast, experts care either about the policy they ad-
vice on or about the decision maker’s perception of their competence. Second,
the advice provided by the experts in our model has a real e¤ect in that it deter-
mines the action set available to the decision maker. In our application, which
concerns an electoral competition, we believe our setup to be very natural.
6 Concluding Discussion
The results of the present paper were derived in a simple framework. In this
concluding section we will discuss which of the assumptions of the model are
needed for our results to hold qualitatively, and which ones merely served the
22 See, for example, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2000, 2001).
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purpose of simplifying the analysis. At the end of the section we will also
brie‡y mention what our results may imply for two related questions that were
not studied here.
One assumption that is crucial for our results is that the candidates can
only make their platform choices contingent on their own information and not
on what their opponent says. That is, we do not allow platforms that take the
form “I promise to lower taxes if I and my opponent say that this is good for the
economy.” If we allowed the candidates to make such commitments, then they
would be able to transmit all their information to the electorate. We believe
it is natural, however, to rule out such commitments in a model of electoral
competition, since it seems implausible that they would be used in the real
world.23
Another reason why our particular commitment assumption is important
is that if the candidates were not able to commit to any platform, then they
may — once they are in o¢ce — simply do what is in the electorate’s interest.
Our assumption that the candidates can commit could, in principle, be justi…ed
by thinking of it as a reduced form of a repeated game (similar to Alesina,
1988). For the repeated-game argument to be valid, however, there must be
some bene…t associated with the candidates’ having access to a commitment
technology. This would potentially be the case if the candidates, besides being
o¢ce-motivated, had ideological (or other) leanings toward one of the policies.
An important question is therefore whether our results are robust to such an
extension.
Hence, consider a variation of our original model in which both candidates,
on top of their payo¤ from holding o¢ce, receive some incremental payo¤ ° 6= 0
(where j°j is not too large) if policy N is implemented, but which otherwise
is identical to the model described in Section 2. Two things will change in
this setting. First, even without imposing Assumption 1, the fully revealing
equilibria in Proposition 1 will no longer exist.24 The reason for this is that,
23 One possible theoretical justi…cation for not allowing such commitments is that in a
natural extension of the model in which the candidates have private information about their
own competence, they would not have an incentive to commit in this fashion. For a candidate
who makes his own policy choice a function of his opponent’s opinion may signal that he does
not trust his own judgement — i.e., that the candidate knows that he is of low competence.
24 As long as we do not impose Assumption 1, however, an equilibrium in which one signal
is transmitted will still exist. In this equilibrium one candidate babbles on his preferred policy
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in order to sustain those equilibria, one candidate must win with probability
one regardless of his platform choice. But if so, this candidate will always
choose his preferred policy instead of following his signal. Second, given these
policy preferences of the candidates, some equilibria will not be Pareto rankable.
All other essential parts of our analysis we would expect to be qualitatively
una¤ected by such an extension. In particular, we have veri…ed that the good
mixed equilibrium still exists and that it gives the voter higher expected utility
than all other equilibria satisfying Assumption 1. Furthermore, we strongly
believe that Propositions 2 and 4 would remain valid.
Another assumption of the model, which is obviously important, is that the
candidates somehow have access to policy-relevant information. One plausible
justi…cation for this is that, often in the real world, interest groups, think tanks,
and bureaucrats freely provide politicians with such information. Another possi-
bility would be that the politicians themselves acquired the information. Given
our assumption that the candidates do not care about the true state, however,
it is not clear whether they would have an incentive to do that if information
acquisition is costly (and unobservable). One may therefore wonder whether
our results are also robust to an extension in which the candidates care about
the true state. In particular, suppose both candidates, on top of their payo¤
from holding o¢ce, receive some incremental payo¤ ± > 0 if the implemented
policy is identical to the true state. This extension is quite complex, since here
the candidates’ incentive constraints will depend on their beliefs about the true
state. We have veri…ed, however, that the good mixed equilibrium exists if ± is
su¢ciently small,25 and it is also fairly straightforward to see that the equilibria
in which the candidates play pure still exist (including the fully revealing ones
listed in Proposition 1). In general, we would expect all essential results of our
model to be robust to this extension.
Finally, we assumed the existence of a single voter. Clearly, we could have
assumed the existence of multiple identical voters without changing our results.
Alternatively, one could have assumed an (odd) number of voters who di¤er in
their preferences with regard to policy B and N. In such a generalization, we
and the other candidate follows his signal. To induce the latter candidate to reveal his signal
truthfully, he is elected with a lower probability whenever he chooses his preferred policy.
25 For simplicity, we restricted attention to the case in which ½ = 0.
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can think of our voter as being the median voter.26
Let us conclude by pointing at a couple of possible implications of our results
that go beyond the questions that we have been immediately concerned with
in this paper. First, the result that the candidates’ behavior is very much
guided by their beliefs about popular opinion suggests that they should have an
incentive to acquire information about the electorate’s beliefs rather than about
the policy-relevant state of the world: a candidate who wants to win an election
should use his campaign funds to buy public opinion polls rather than hiring
an expert on the policy issue itself. Indeed, in the real world we often observe
that political parties commission public opinion polls. Second, the result that
policy platforms typically re‡ect popular opinion rather than the candidates’
information about the true state suggests that interest groups may well prefer
to address the electorate directly (e.g. through TV commercials) rather than
providing the candidates with the same information.
Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of Proposition 1. For an equilibrium to be fully revealing we must have
¾Bi 2 f0; 1g and ¾Ni = 1 ¡ ¾Bi for all i 2 f1; 2g. Thus, there are four cases
to consider: (i) ¾B1 = ¾
B








2 = 0 and
¾N1 = ¾
N












2 = 1 and
¾B1 = ¾
N
2 = 0. We must show that: (i) and (ii) cannot be part of an equilibrium;






3 = 1; and







Suppose (i) is part of an equilibrium. By de…nition, in any fully revealing
equilibrium the voter can infer both candidates’ signals. Because in (i) a candi-
date’s chosen policy platform is always identical to the signal he has received,
the candidate who has chosen platform B wins whenever the chosen platforms
di¤er: ¾BN3 = 1 and ¾
NB
3 = 0. In equilibrium, choosing policy N when having
observed a signal N (i.e., ¾Ni = 0) must be a best response for both candidates;
i.e.:
¾NN3 PNjN ¸ ¾BB3 PBjN + PNjN ; (6)
26 One caveat, however, is that if the electorate is su¢ciently heterogenous, equilibria with









PBjN + PNjN ; (7)
where we used the simplifying notation
Pjjk ´ Pr (s2 = j j s1 = k) ´ Pr (s1 = j j s2 = k)
for j; k 2 fB;Ng (the latter identity holds because the quality of the two signals
are the same). Adding inequalities (6) and (7) yields PNjN ¸ PBjN + 2PNjN ,
which is impossible since PBjN = 1 ¡ PNjN .
Now, suppose (ii) is part of an equilibrium. Again, the voter can infer
both candidates’ signals. Because in (ii) a candidate’s chosen policy platform
is always opposite to the signal he has received, the candidate who has chosen
platform B, again, wins whenever the chosen platforms di¤er: ¾BN3 = 1 and
¾NB3 = 0. In equilibrium, choosing policy N when having observed a signal B
(i.e., ¾Bi = 0) must be a best response for both candidates; i.e.:








PNjB + PBjB: (9)
Adding inequalities (8) and (9) yields PBjB ¸ PNjB+2PBjB, which is impossible.
Next, consider case (iii). Again, the voter can infer both candidates’ signals.
Because candidate 1’s chosen signal is always identical to the signal he has
received and candidate 2’s chosen signal is always opposite to the signal he has
received, candidate 1 wins whenever the chosen platforms di¤er: ¾BN3 = 1 and
¾NB3 = 1. In equilibrium, candidate 2’s choosing policy N when having observed








Moreover, candidate 2’s choosing policy B when having observed a signal N








Adding inequalities (10) and (11), using PNjN = 1¡PBjN and PBjB = 1¡PNjB,






¢ ¸ 0: (12)
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Since PBjB > PNjB, inequality (12) can only be met if ¾BB3 = ¾NN3 = 1.






3 = 1, then clearly none of
the candidates has an incentive to deviate. This establishes the claim for case
(iii). Case (iv) is analogous to case (iii) and is therefore omitted. ¥
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2
In order to prove Proposition 2, we will use Lemmas A1-A3 stated and proven
below.
Lemma A1. In any babbling equilibrium in which (x1; x2) = (B;N) (respec-
tively, (x1; x2) = (N;B)) along the equilibrium path, one has ¾BN3 = 1
(respectively, ¾NB3 = 0).
Proof. By de…nition, in a babbling equilibrium no information is revealed.
Thus, the voter’s posterior is equal to her prior. Hence the voter strictly prefers
a candidate who has chosen platform B to a candidate who has chosen platform
N. ¥
Lemma A2. Suppose q > 1 ¡ ". Then, in any babbling equilibrium in which
either x1 = B or x2 = N (respectively, either x1 = N or x2 = B) along
the equilibrium path, one has ¾BN3 = 1 (respectively, ¾
NB
3 = 0).
Proof. In case no candidate deviated the claim follows from Lemma A1.
Thus, suppose one candidate deviated. For q > 1 ¡ ", the voter strictly prefers
policy B if she knows at most one signal. Thus, independently of what beliefs
the voter holds about the deviator’s signal, she strictly prefers a candidate who
has chosen platform B to a candidate who has chosen platform N. ¥
Lemma A3. Suppose q < 1 ¡ " and that ¾jk3 , for j; k 2 fB;Ng, is part of
a babbling equilibrium in which (x1; x2) = (j; k) only o¤ the equilibrium
path. Then there exist beliefs on the part of the voter that support any
¾jk3 2 [0; 1].
Proof. Since (x1; x2) = (j; k) is o¤ the equilibrium path at least one can-
didate deviated, so the voter’s beliefs about that candidate’s signal are not
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determined by Bayes’ rule. Moreover, for q < 1 ¡ ", believing that one candi-
date’s signal is in favor of N and that the other candidate is babbling su¢ces
to make the voter prefer N. Hence, one can always …nd some out-of-equilibrium
beliefs on the part of the voter about the deviator’s signal (or the deviators’
signals) that make any ¾jk3 2 [0; 1] optimal. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. We will prove the proposition by …rst considering all
possible babbling equilibria in pure strategies and showing that only the ones
listed in the proposition exist and satisfy Assumption 1. Thereafter we will
show that no other equilibrium in which both candidates play pure survives
Assumption 1.
In any babbling equilibrium in which the candidates play pure, one has
¾Bi = ¾
N
i = ¾i and ¾i 2 f0; 1g for all i 2 f1; 2g. Thus there are four cases to
investigate: (i) ¾1 = ¾2 = 1; (ii) ¾1 = 1, ¾2 = 0; (iii) ¾1 = ¾2 = 0; (iv) ¾1 = 0,
¾2 = 1.
Consider case (i). From Lemma A3 we know that, for q < 1 ¡ ", any
¾NB3 ; ¾
BN
3 2 [0; 1] are consistent with the voter’s incentive constraints being sat-
is…ed. By Assumption 1, ¾BB3 = ¾
NN
3 = 1=2. In equilibrium, each candidate’s
choosing policy B must be a best response. This requires that ¾BB3 ¸ ¾NB3 and
1¡¾BB3 ¸ 1¡¾BN3 or, equivalently, ¾NB3  ¾BB3 = 1=2  ¾BN3 . By Assumption
1, ¾BN3 = 1¡¾NB3 . Thus, for q < 1¡", case (i) is part of a babbling equilibrium
if and only if ¾NB3 2 [0; 1=2] and ¾BN3 = 1 ¡ ¾NB3 . Moreover, for q > 1 ¡ " it
follows from Lemma A2 that case (i) is part of a babbling equilibrium if and
only if ¾NB3 = 0 and ¾
BN
3 = 1. Case (i) corresponds to part (a) of Proposition
2.
Consider case (ii). By Lemma A1, ¾BN3 = 1. In equilibrium, candidate 2’s
choosing policy N must be a best response. That is, 1 ¡ ¾BN3 ¸ 1 ¡ ¾BB3 . This
inequality in conjunction with ¾BN3 = 1, however, imply ¾
BB
3 = 1, which is
inconsistent with Assumption 1. Hence, case (ii) cannot be part of a babbling
equilibrium.
Consider case (iii). By Lemma A2, for q > 1 ¡ ", ¾BN3 = 1 and ¾NB3 = 0.
From Lemma A3 we know that, for q < 1 ¡ ", any ¾NB3 ; ¾BN3 2 [0; 1] are
consistent with the voter’s incentive constraints being satis…ed. Moreover, by
Assumption 1, ¾BB3 = ¾
NN
3 = 1=2. In equilibrium, choosing policy N (i.e.,
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¾1 = 0 and ¾2 = 0) must be a best response for both candidates. That is,
¾NN3 ¸ ¾BN3 and 1 ¡ ¾NN3 ¸ 1 ¡ ¾NB3 . Hence, ¾BN3  ¾NN3 = 1=2  ¾NB3 .
These inequalities, however, are inconsistent with ¾BN3 = 1 and ¾
NB
3 = 0. Thus,
for q > 1 ¡ ", case (iii) cannot be part of a babbling equilibrium. For q < 1 ¡ ",
case (iii) is part of a babbling equilibrium if and only if ¾BN3 2 [0; 1=2] and
¾NB3 = 1 ¡ ¾BN3 . Case (iii) corresponds to part (b) of Proposition 2. Case (iv)
is analogous to case (ii) and therefore omitted.
Let us now show that there exists no other equilibrium in which both candi-
dates play pure and which survives Assumption 1 than the babbling ones. As can
be seen from Proposition 1, Assumption 1 rules out the possibility of an equilib-
rium with full revelation. We are left to consider the possibility of equilibria in
which one candidate babbles and the other fully reveals his signal. Suppose such
an equilibrium exists. Along the equilibrium path of any such equilibrium, the
voter will face two situations: one in which the candidates announced the same
platform and another in which they announced di¤erent platforms. Since the
voter learns exactly one signal in the kind of equilibrium under consideration,
she strictly prefers one of the candidates to the other whenever their platforms
di¤er (recall that we ignore the knife-edge case in which q = 1 ¡ "). Hence,
whenever x1 6= x2, she either votes for (a) the fully revealing candidate or (b)
the babbling candidate with probability one. In case (a), however, the revealing
candidate has a strict incentive to always announce the platform that the bab-
bling candidate has not chosen; this is because if he chose the same platform
as the babbling candidate, then, by Assumption 1, he would get elected with
probability 1/2. Similarly, in case (b), the revealing candidate always has an
incentive to choose the same platform as the babbling candidate; this is because
here, again by Assumption 1, he gets elected with positive probability 1/2 if his
platform is identical to the babbling candidate’s platform. ¥
Appendix C: Proof of Proposition 3
In order to prove Proposition 3, we will use Lemmas A4-A10 stated and proven
below. Lemmas A4-A6 and A8-A9 concern strategy pro…les that satisfy a re-
quirement we call Condition 1. This is the requirement on the candidates’
behavior that we made in subsection 4.2 and which gave us (2) and (3) and
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eventually the good mixed equilibrium. Formally, we say that Condition 1a
respectively Condition 1b is satis…ed if: (a) for all i 2 f1; 2g, we do not have
¾Bi = ¾
N




i = 1; and (b) we do have
Pr (! = !B j x1 = B;x2 = N) = Pr (! = !B j x1 = N;x2 = B) = 1
2
.
And we say that Condition 1 is satis…ed if Condition 1a and Condition 1b are
satis…ed. Notice that, under Assumption 1, if Condition 1b is violated so is Con-
dition 1a. To see this, suppose, for example, that Pr (! = !B j x1 = B;x2 = N) <
1=2. Then ¾BN3 = 0. Moreover, by Assumption 1, ¾
NB





1=2. Hence, candidate 1 will choose B with positive probability only if candidate
2 chooses N with zero probability; i.e., either ¾B1 = ¾
N





which violates Condition 1a.
Lemma A4. Condition 1 implies (2) and (3). Furthermore, if Condition 1a
is satis…ed then (2) and (3) imply Condition 1b.
Proof. First, we show that Condition 1 implies (2) and (3). Given that Con-
dition 1a holds, Condition 1b and Bayes’ rule (which is well de…ned if Condition
1a holds) imply that
Pr (! = !B j x1 = B;x2 = N)
=
Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !B)Pr (! = !B)P





Rewriting (13) we have
q Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !B) = (1 ¡ q)Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !N) :
(14)
We can also write
Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !j)
= Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j s1 = B; s2 = B)Pr (s1 = B; s2 = B j ! = !j)
+ Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j s1 = B; s2 = N)Pr (s1 = B; s2 = N j ! = !j)
+ Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j s1 = N; s2 = B)Pr (s1 = N; s2 = B j ! = !j)
+ Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j s1 = N; s2 = N)Pr (s1 = N; s2 = N j ! = !j)
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for j 2 fB;Ng. Hence,




















"2 + ½" (1 ¡ ")¤ (15)
and














(1 ¡ ")2 + ½" (1 ¡ ")
i
: (16)
Substituting (15) and (16) into (14) and then rewriting one has (2).27 Similarly,
Condition 1b also requires that Pr (! = !B j x1 = N;x2 = B) = 1=2, which
(using Bayes’ rule) can be rewritten as
q Pr (x1 = N;x2 = B j ! = !B) = (1 ¡ q)Pr (x1 = N;x2 = B j ! = !N) : (17)










(1 ¡ " ¡ q) : (18)
Subtracting (18) from (2) yields (3). Hence, in an equilibrium that satis…es
Condition 1, (2) and (3) must hold. It remains to show that if Condition 1a
is satis…ed then (2) and (3) imply that Condition 1b is met. First, subtracting
(3) from (2) yields (18). Moreover, (2) and (18) are just rewritten forms of (14)
and (17), respectively. Hence, provided that Bayes’ rule is well-de…ned (which
it is if Condition 1a is satis…ed), (2) and (3) imply Condition 1b. ¥








Proof. From the proof of Lemma A4 we know that, in any equilibrium
satisfying Condition 1, (14) must hold. Hence, since q > 1=2, we must have
Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !B) < Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !N) : (19)













































Inequality (20) implies that if ¾B2 < ¾
N




1 ; and inequality (21)
implies that if ¾B1 < ¾
N









¢ ¸ 0. It remains to show that we cannot have ¡¾B1 ¡ ¾N1 ¢ ¡¾B2 ¡ ¾N2 ¢ =
0. To see this, notice that if we use ¾B1 = ¾
N











2 ; hence, ¾
B
1 6= ¾N1 . A similar exercise for ¾B2
and ¾N2 gives us ¾
B
2 6= ¾N2 . ¥
Lemma A6. If an equilibrium satis…es Condition 1, the voter’s expected utility
can be written as
EUcond1 = ¾
B
i (q ¡ ") ¡ ¾Ni (1 ¡ " ¡ q) + 1 ¡ q; for i 2 f1; 2g:
















Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !N)+
¾NB3 Pr (x1 = N;x2 = B j ! = !N) + Pr (x1 = N;x2 = N j ! = !N)
¸
:
It follows from the proof of Lemma A4 that Condition 1 requires that (14) and
(17) hold. Using (14) and (17) to rewrite the above equation one obtains
EUcond1 = q [Pr (x1 = B;x2 = B j ! = !B) + Pr (x1 = N;x2 = B j ! = !B)] +
(1 ¡ q) [Pr (x1 = B;x2 = N j ! = !N) + Pr (x1 = N;x2 = N j ! = !N)] :
This equation simpli…es to
EUcond1 = q Pr (x2 = B j ! = !B) + (1 ¡ q)Pr (x2 = N j ! = !N)
= q
£
¾B2 (1 ¡ ") + ¾N2 "
¤
+ (1 ¡ q) £¡1 ¡ ¾B2 ¢ " + ¡1 ¡ ¾N2 ¢ (1 ¡ ")¤
= ¾B2 (q ¡ ") ¡ ¾N2 (1 ¡ " ¡ q) + 1 ¡ q;
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which means that the lemma is true for i = 2. Since Condition 1 is met, Lemma
A4 implies that (3) is satis…ed. It follows from (3) that if the lemma is true for
i = 2, then it is also true for i = 1. ¥
Lemma A7. Suppose Assumption 1 is satis…ed. Then, in any equilibrium in
which at least one of the candidates is randomizing, ¾BN3 = ¾
NB
3 = 1=2:
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exist an equilibrium in which one candidate
chooses both platforms with positive probability and in which ¾NB3 > 1=2 or
¾NB3 < 1=2: First, suppose that in equilibrium ¾
NB
3 > 1=2. Then, by Assump-
tion 1, ¾BN3 = 1 ¡ ¾NB3 < 1=2: Hence, independently of whether candidate 2
chooses platform B or N (or randomizes with any probability between them),







3 . Symmetrically, independently of whether candi-
date 1 chooses platform B or N , candidate 2’s unique best response is to choose
platform N . Hence, if ¾NB3 > 1=2, both candidates choose platform N in equi-
librium, contradicting the assumption of the proof that one candidate chooses
both platforms with positive probability. The proof that both candidates choose
platform B if ¾NB3 < 1=2 is analogous and therefore omitted. ¥
Lemma A8. For q < 1¡", the outcome of b¾ Pareto dominates the outcomes
of all other equilibria that satisfy Assumption 1 and Condition 1.
Proof. Condition 1a together with the fact that an equilibrium that satis…es
Assumption 1 cannot be fully revealing imply that at least one candidate is
randomizing. Hence, from Lemma A7 and Assumption 1 it follows that the
candidates are indi¤erent between all equilibria that satisfy Assumption 1 and
Condition 1. This means that, in order to prove the claim in the lemma, it
su¢ces to show that the outcome of b¾ gives the voter higher expected utility than
the outcomes of all other equilibria that satisfy Assumption 1 and Condition




























(1 ¡ " ¡ q)






2 2 [0; 1].
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In solving this problem, it will be useful to note that the value of the objective










= (1; f (q; "; ½) ; 1; f (q; "; ½)) is
q ¡ " ¡ f (q; "; ½) (1 ¡ " ¡ q) > 0;
since q¡" > 1¡"¡q. Hence, since ¡¾B1 ; ¾N1 ; ¾B2 ; ¾N2 ¢ = (1; f (q; "; ½) ; 1; f (q; "; ½))
satis…es the constraints (2) and (3), the value of the objective function eval-
uated at the solution of the maximization problem is positive. In particu-
lar, since Lemma A6 implies that the objective function can be rewritten as
¾Bi (q ¡ ") ¡ ¾Ni (1 ¡ " ¡ q), this rules out that ¾Bi = 0 for i = f1; 2g. Further-
more, one may rule out that ¾Ni = 1 since
q ¡ " ¡ f (q; "; ½) (1 ¡ " ¡ q) > ¾Bi (q ¡ ") ¡ (1 ¡ " ¡ q) :
Next, we set up the Lagrangian for the above maximization problem and




































(1 ¡ " ¡ q)
¸























¡ ¸ ©¡¾B1 (q ¡ ") + ¡¾B1 ¡ ¾N1 ¢Kª
+¹ (q ¡ ") ¡ µB2 ; (22)
@L
@¾N2
= 0 = ¡(1 ¡ " ¡ q)
2
¡ ¸©¡ ¡¾B1 ¡ ¾N1 ¢K + ¾N1 (1 ¡ " ¡ q)ª
¡ ¹ (1 ¡ " ¡ q) + µN2 : (23)
Since we have ruled out that either ¾Bi = 0 or ¾
N
i = 1 for i 2 f1; 2g, we
are left to check the cases in which either ¾Bi = 1 or ¾
B
i 2 (0; 1) and in which
either ¾Ni = 0 or ¾
N
i 2 (0; 1) for i 2 f1; 2g. Thus, we have to consider 24 = 16
cases. By Proposition 1, ¾B1 = ¾
B




2 = 0 is not an equilibrium,
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and hence we are left to consider the following 15 cases for candidate solutions:






2 2 (0; 1); (2) ¾B1 = 1 and ¾N1 ; ¾B2 ; ¾N2 2 (0; 1); (2’) ¾B2 = 1









2 2 (0; 1); (4) ¾B1 = 1; ¾N1 = 0; and ¾B2 ; ¾N2 2 (0; 1); (4’) ¾B2 = 1;




1 2 (0; 1); (5) ¾N1 = 0; ¾B2 = 1, and ¾B1 ; ¾N2 2 (0; 1); (5’)
¾B1 = 1; ¾
N




2 2 (0; 1); (6) ¾B1 = ¾B2 = 1 and ¾N1 ; ¾N2 2 (0; 1); (7)
¾N1 = ¾
N




2 2 (0; 1); (8) ¾B1 = ¾B2 = 1, ¾N1 = 0 and ¾N2 2 (0; 1);
(8’) ¾B1 = ¾
B
2 = 1, ¾
N
2 = 0 and ¾
N
1 2 (0; 1); (9) ¾N1 = ¾N2 = 0; ¾B1 = 1 and
¾B2 2 (0; 1); (9’) ¾N1 = ¾N2 = 0; ¾B2 = 1 and ¾B1 2 (0; 1). It is easy to see that
cases (2’)-(5’), (8’), and (9’) are symmetric to the corresponding cases (2)-(5),
(8), and (9) and therefore we will omit them below.
In the following, we show that the only candidate solution belongs to case (6),










= (1; f (q; "; ½) ; 1; f (q; "; ½)). Below
we use the fact that if ¾ji 2 (0; 1) then µji = 0.
Cases 1-4: Here one has µB2 = µ
N
2 = 0. Rewriting (22) and (23) in matrix
form, using the fact that µB2 = µ
N
2 = 0, gives usµ ¡(q ¡ ") + K ¡K







2¸ (q ¡ ")
¡1+2¹2¸ (1 ¡ " ¡ q)
¶
:





(q ¡ ") [1 ¡ " ¡ q + K] ¡ 1 + 2¹
2¸




(1 ¡ " ¡ q) [(q ¡ ") ¡ K] + 1 + 2¹
2¸
(q ¡ ") K:
This equation holds if
(q ¡ ") [1 ¡ " ¡ q + K] ¡ (1 ¡ " ¡ q)K = (1 ¡ " ¡ q) [(q ¡ ") ¡ K] + (q ¡ ")K;
which simpli…es to (q ¡ ") (1 ¡ " ¡ q) = (1 ¡ " ¡ q) (q ¡ "). Hence, if µB2 =




1 , which contradicts Lemma A5.
Case 5: Using ¾B2 = 1 and ¾
N







0. This equality, however, contradicts ¾B1 ; ¾
N
2 2 (0; 1) since K > 0.
Case 6: Using ¾B1 = ¾B2 = 1 in constraint (3), one has ¾N1 = ¾N2 = ¾N .
Next, by using ¾B1 = ¾
B





N in constraint (2), we can solve










= (1; f (q; "; ½) ; 1; f (q; "; ½))
is one candidate for the maximum.
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Case 7: Substituting ¾N1 = ¾
N







") + ¾B1 ¾
B
2 K = 0. This equality, however, contradicts ¾
B
1 2 (0; 1).
Case 8: Using ¾B1 = ¾
B
2 = 1 and ¾
N
1 = 0, constraint (3) simpli…es to
¡¾N2 (1 ¡ " ¡ q) = 0, which contradicts ¾N2 2 (0; 1).




2 = 0, constraint (3) simpli…es to¡
1 ¡ ¾B2
¢











= (1; f (q; "; ½) ; 1; f (q; "; ½)) must be the maximum
since it is the only candidate and we know (from standard arguments) that there
exists a solution to the maximization problem. ¥
Lemma A9. Suppose Assumption 1 is satis…ed. Then, in any equilibrium
that violates Condition 1a and in which at least one of the candidates is
randomizing, the voter’s expected utility is equal to her expected utility
in one of the babbling equilibria.
Proof. Since, by Lemma A7, the voter elects each candidate with probability
1/2 independently of their platform choices, she is always indi¤erent between
the candidates. Hence, her expected utility is independent of which candidate
she elects. Since Condition 1a is violated, at least one candidate plays a pure
babbling strategy. Thus, the voter’s expected utility must be equal to her utility
in one of the babbling equilibria. ¥
Lemma A10. Suppose Assumption 1 is satis…ed and that q > 1 ¡ ". Then
the unique equilibrium is the popular-beliefs equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following three categories of equilibria (all of which are
assumed to satisfy Assumption 1): (i) pure-strategy equilibria, (ii) equilibria
that are not pure and which satisfy Condition 1, and (iii) equilibria that are not
pure and which violate Condition 1a. (Recall from above that if Condition 1b is
violated then Condition 1a must be violated.) First consider category (i). Here
the claim follows from Proposition 2, which says that for q > 1 ¡ " there exists
no other pure-strategy equilibrium. Next consider category (ii). Equilibria
belonging to this category do not exist for q > 1 ¡ ". To see this, notice that
for q > 1 ¡ " the right-hand side of (2) is less than or equal to zero whereas the
left-hand side is, by Lemma A5, strictly positive. Hence, equality (2) does not
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hold, which means (by Lemma A4) that there exists no equilibrium satisfying
Condition 1. Finally consider category (iii). Since Condition 1a is violated, at
least one candidate is babbling. Hence, the voter can infer information about
at most one candidate’s signal. Thus, since q > 1 ¡ ", she always prefers policy
B, and she will therefore never vote for a candidate who announces policy N .
As a consequence, both candidates have a strict incentive to announce policy B
and, for q > 1 ¡ ", the only equilibrium that satis…es Assumption 1 is thus the
popular-beliefs equilibrium. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3. The two claims made in the …rst sentence of the
proposition follows from the arguments in the main body of the paper. The
claim made in the third sentence is proven by Lemma A10. The remaining
claim is that for q < 1¡" the outcome of the good mixed equilibrium, b¾, Pareto
dominates the outcomes of all other equilibria that satisfy Assumption 1. We
will prove this claim by considering in turn the following three categories of
equilibria (all of which are assumed to satisfy Assumption 1): (i) pure-strategy
equilibria, (ii) equilibria that are not pure and which satisfy Condition 1, and
(iii) equilibria that are not pure and which violate Condition 1a. (Recall from
above that if Condition 1b is violated then Condition 1a must be violated.) First
consider category (i). Here, by Proposition 2, the only equilibria are the two
kinds of babbling equilibria and in these both candidates win with probability
1=2 along the equilibrium path. The candidates are thus indi¤erent between the
two kinds of babbling equilibria whereas the voter prefers the popular-beliefs
equilibria. Hence, the popular-beliefs equilibria Pareto dominate the equilibria
in which the candidates babble on N. Moreover, the candidates also win with
probability 1=2 in the good mixed equilibrium, b¾, whereas the voter prefers b¾ to
the popular-beliefs equilibria. To see the latter, notice that EUmix > EUBbab can
equivalently be written as 1 ¡ " ¡ f (q; "; ½) (1 ¡ " ¡ q) > q. This inequality, in
turn, is equivalent to 1 > f (q; "; ½), which always holds for q < 1¡". Hence, the
good mixed equilibrium Pareto dominates the popular-beliefs equilibria. Next
consider category (ii). Here the claim follows from Lemma A8. Finally consider
category (iii). By Lemma A7, the candidates will be indi¤erent between all
equilibria in this category. By Lemma A9, the voter’s expected utility in any
such equilibrium is equal to her expected utility in either one of the babbling
35
equilibria, both of which are dominated by the good mixed equilibrium. ¥
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Figure 1:  Voter’s expected utility in 















Figure 2:  Voter’s expected utility in equilibria












Good mixed equilibrium )( mixEU
)( BMEU
